KHRG Photo Gallery 2010-B The second installment[1] of KHRG's Photo Gallery 2010 includes 95 still photographs selected from images taken by KHRG field researchers since December 2009. Of these photos, 50 were taken between December 2009 and March 2010, and 45 were taken between April and July 2010. Photos were taken in Papun, Nyaunglebin, Toungoo, Mergui/Tavoy, Pa'an and Dooplaya districts of locally-defined Karen State, as well as at sites on the Thai side of the Thailand – Burma border. This edition of the gallery has been divided into six subsections: Establishment of Border Guard Forces and strategic displacement; Involuntary repatriation of refugees in Tha Song Yang District; Surviving with dignity beyond military control; Life under military control; Livelihoods under strain; Landmines; and Children in armed conflict. KHRG is committed to documenting not just the way that villagers are victims of human rights abuses, but also the myriad protection strategies they employ to resist abuse as well as maintain cultural practices and continuity in their lives. Consequently, all sections of this report include a wide variety of photo selections, not just photos of villagers as victims. Since the last photo gallery was released, KHRG has continued to document patterns of abuse consistent with those presented in earlier editions. Villagers already under government control continue to report abuses related to attempts by the Tatmadaw, Burma's state army, and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) holding ceasefire agreements with the Tatmadaw such as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) to consolidate control and support ongoing militarization of the countryside. Elsewhere, Tatmadaw forces continue efforts to expand control of territory and civilian populations, particularly in upland areas in northern Karen State. Though the Northern Karen State Offensive ended in 2008, military attacks on villagers in hiding, and their means of survival, nonetheless continue.[2] According to the most recent figures, more than 70,000 villagers remain displaced and in hiding in northern Karen areas, of whom more than 28,000 have been displaced or re-displaced within the past year;[3] between August 2009 and July 2010, at least 95 more villages were destroyed, relocated or abandoned.[4] In 2010, disagreements between the Tatmadaw and some sections of the DKBA over the latter's absorption into the Tatmadaw as Border Guard battalions also increased insecurity for villagers in Pa'an and Dooplaya districts in central Karen State, as civilians worried that open conflict would return to the region.[5] Despite the many challenges to civilian security and livelihoods, however, villagers in eastern Burma continue to show bravery and resilience, employing a range of strategies to protect their families and communities from abuse and the effects of abuse. Photos included in the Photo Gallery are identified with alphanumeric characters shown below each image. To view the first instalment of KHRG’s Photo Gallery 2010, click here. All photos are by KHRG except where otherwise noted. Terms and Abbreviations IED | Improvised explosive device, sometimes used to describe homemade landmines and other explosives used by the DKBA and KNLA | Na Sa Ka | SPDC's 'Border Defense' force | UXO | Unexploded ordnance | SPDC | State Peace & Development Council; military junta ruling Burma | PDC | Peace & Development Council; SPDC local-level administration, (e.g. Village PDC [VPDC], Village Tract PDC, Township PDC [TPDC]) | Village tract | An administrative unit of 5 to 20 villages in a local area, often centred on a large village | Tatmadaw | SPDC Armed Forces; Tatmadaw Kyi is the Army, often referred to here as the SPDC Army | IB | Infantry Battalion (SPDC), supposed to be about 500 soldiers strong but at present most SPDC battalions number under 200 | LIB | Light Infantry Battalion (SPDC) , supposed to be about 500 soldiers strong but at present most SPDC battalions number under 200 | LID | Light Infantry Division (SPDC), consisting of 10 Light Infantry Battalions | MOC | Military Operations Command (SPDC/SLORC); 10 battalions, for offensive operations, may be deployed anywhere | Company | Military unit of about 100 soldiers, though often under-strength in SPDC Army | Column | Combination of Companies, assembled for operations; usually 100-300 soldiers | Camp | Army base or outpost; from remote hill posts of 10 soldiers to Battalion HQ camps of several hundred soldiers | BGF | Tatmadaw Border Guard Force | NCO | Non-commissioned officers; Lance Corporals, Corporals, and Sergeants | KNU | Karen National Union; main Karen opposition group | KNLA | Karen National Liberation Army; armed wing of the KNU | DKBA | Democratic Karen Buddhist Army; Karen group allied with the SPDC | KPF | Karen Peace Force, Nyein Chan Yay A'Pweh ("Peace Group") in Burmese; formed in 1997 by defected KNLA officer Thu Mu Heh and allied with SPDC | RTA | Royal Thai Army | loh ah pay | Forced labour; literally it means traditional voluntary labour, but used by SPDC officers in reference to short-term forced labour | Set tha | 'Messenger'; forced labour as errand-runners, messengers, and for some odd jobs | viss | Unit of weight measure; one viss is 1.6 kilograms or 3.5 pounds | milk tin | Volume measure equivalent to the contents of a 200 ml condensed milk tin | bowl/pyi | Volume measure equivalent to 8 small condensed milk tins; about 2 kg / 4.4 lb of rice | kyat | Burmese currency; US$1=6 Kyat at official rate, 1200+ Kyat at current market rate | Paddy | Rice grain still in the husk | Rice | Rice grain after pounding or milling, with the husk removed and ready to cook |
Establishment of Border Guard Forces and strategic displacement In early 2009, Burma's State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) authorities initiated the final stages of a plan to press non-state armed groups in Burma's border regions that had previously signed ceasefire agreements with the SPDC to either disband and form legal political parties to contest the 2010 national elections, or else transform themselves into "Border Guard Forces" under more direct authority of the Tatmadaw, Burma's state army.[6] An April 28th 2009 directive issued by the SPDC instructed ceasefire groups to begin the transformation process;[7] on May 7th 2009, commanding officers stated in a high-level meeting of Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) officers at DKBA headquarters in Myaing Gyi Ngu, Pa'an District that the group would commence its transformation.[8] Negotiations and internal DKBA disagreement about the extent of integration into the Tatmadaw, however, continued for more than a year, with several deadlines for formal transformation passing.[9] In June 2010, a 'final' transformation deadline of August 10th 2010 was declared along with threats of armed force for non-compliance, and Na Kha Mway, the commander of DKBA forces variously referred to as Battalion #907, 'Klo Htoo Baw', and 5th Brigade, indicated that troops under his command would not join the BGF with other DKBA factions.[10] On July 22nd Na Kha Mway formally rejected the BGF proposal, and tensions between Tatmadaw and non-complying DKBA forces further escalated amid speculation that Tatmadaw forces might attack and attempt to arrest Na Kha Mway, possibly in a joint-operation with those DKBA forces that had decided to cooperate with the BGF plan. On July 25th, more than 600 villagers in northeastern Kawkareik Township, Dooplaya District began to flee from their villages to Thailand's Phop Phra District in anticipation of an imminent Tatmadaw attack on Na Kha Mway's forces in the area.[11] A-1
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| Photos A-1, A-2 and A-3, taken on July 25th 2010, show residents of Lay Ghaw, Wah May Htar, U Gklay Htar, Hee Ther Pler, Thay Baw Boh, and Bler Doh villages in Kawkareik Township, Dooplaya District, crossing the Moei River with their belongings to take refuge in Muh Luh Chah village in Phop Phra District of Thailand's Tak Province. Some villagers reported that DKBA 5th Brigade officers under the command of Na Kha Mway had called a meeting of village heads and instructed them to inform all women and children in their villages to flee in advance of the expected attacks. [Photos: KHRG] | A-4
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| Photos A-4, A-5 and A-6, taken on July 25th 2010, show Lay Ghaw, Wah May Htar, U Gklay Htar, Hee Ther Pler, Thay Baw Boh, and Bler Doh villagers arriving at Muh Luh Chah[12] village in Phop Phra District, Thailand. Thai soldiers checked the villagers' possessions and papers as they arrived. Local residents of Muh Luh Chah provided food for those refugees who were unable to bring adequate provisions with them, and authorities from the Thai Health Department tended to those in need of medical assistance. Photos A-7 and A-8 show the refugees, including many women and children, at a temporary sheltering site in Muh Luh Chah. [Photos: KHRG] | A-7
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| Photos A-9, A-10, A-11 and A-12, also taken on July 25th2010, show mothers and infant children taking shelter at Muh Luh Chah. On July 26th 2010, at 11 am Thai army officials met with representatives of the displaced villagers and Muh Luh Chah village leaders; the parties agreed that the refugees could return to their homes that day and that they would be permitted to take shelter on the Thai side of the river in the event of future attacks on their villages.
In the months since this agreement was reached, conflict has flared in villages in Dooplaya District adjacent to Thailand's Phop Phra and Tak Provinces as Tatmadaw forces have sought to dislodge some DKBA forces that have continued to resist integration into the Tatmadaw from their former bases, prompting tens of thousands of villagers to seek protection in Thailand. Refugees that spoke with KHRG cited a variety of protection concerns stemming from conflict and conflict-related abuse; they also expressed fears for the security of their livelihoods and property.[13] [Photos: KHRG] | A-11
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| Involuntary repatriation of refugees in Tha Song Yang District Between January and April 2010, villagers from Pa'an District that had been taking refuge at temporary sites in Tha Song Yang District of Thailand's Tak Province were ordered to leave the sites and return to Burma by Thai army officials. The refugees had begun fleeing increased conflict and exploitative abuse in their villages in Lu Bpleh and Dta Greh townships, Pa'an District in June 2009, when State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) Army and Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) troops staged joint attacks on three Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) camps near the Ler Per Her camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Dta Greh Township. The villagers had primarily been hosted in three temporary sites in Tha Song Yang District: Nong Bua, Mae U Su and Mae Salit.[14] At the end of January 2010, Royal Thai Army (RTA) officials announced their intention to repatriate the refugees, stating that the area from which the refugees had fled was now safe for their 'voluntary' return. Although the assertion that returns would be voluntary was disputed by the verbal testimony of numerous villagers and by local civil society and humanitarian groups, the first three families were returned on February 5th. Though no further groups were forced into boats and returned to Burma that day, RTA soldiers maintained consistent pressure on refugees to return, including repeatedly telling them it was safe to return, restricting access to humanitarian services, and harassing residents of the sites. By April 1st 2010 the Nong Bua and Mae U Su sites – which in January had hosted 2,409 refugees – were empty after their inhabitants had gradually submitted to the two-month-long campaign of harassment and pressure by RTA soldiers.[15]
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| Photos B-1 and B-2, taken on February 12th 2010, show families from the Mae U Su refugee camp under guard on the Thailand side of the Moei River, as the RTA prepared to return them to Burma. Photos B-3 and B-4, also taken on February 12th 2010, show some of the families as they returned to the Burma side of the river, and began walking back into Pa'an District. Paths like the one shown serve as the primary travel routes in the area; they also were littered with unmarked landmines that posed a considerable risk to returned refugees. [Photos: Local source] | B-5
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| Photos B-5 and B-6, taken in March 2010, shows RTA soldiers based in Tha Song Yang District, Tak Province arriving at Mae U Su temporary hosting site for refugees that fled Tatmadaw/DKBA attacks on KNLA positions near Ler Per Her in Pa'an in June 2009. Refugees told KHRG that RTA soldiers assembled the refugees two to three times per day to inform them that they could no longer remain in the site and that they should return to Burma. [Photos: KHRG] | B-7
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| Photos B-7, B-8 and B-9, taken in March 2010, show refugees from Ler Per Her dismantling their huts and burning trash in preparation for their departure from Mae U Su refugee site. Refugees interviewed by KHRG and other community-based organisations stated that they did not yet feel secure to return to their villages, but that the Thai authorities had made it clear to them that they would not be permitted to remain in the site. [Photos: KHRG] |
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| Photos B-10, B-11, B-12 and B-13, taken in March 2010, show refugees leaving Mae U Su temporary refugee site with their possessions, and waiting to cross the Moei River that forms the border between Pa'an District and Tak Province in the area. Thai authorities had set the end of March as the deadline for refugees to depart the site. Villages in Dta Greh Township, Pa'an District from which refugees had fled included Htee Tha Htaw, WahMee Gklah, Meh La Ah Kee, Meh La Ah Htar, Gklay Moh Kee, Gklay Poe Kee, Waw Gkyaw, Gkoh Gkwaw Lay, Gkyay Poe Kee and Meh Gkeh; some returning refugees told a KHRG field researcher that they would not dare to work in their farm fields because they feared landmine contamination and worried about food shortages. [Photos: Local source] | B-12
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| Photos B-14 and B-15, taken on June 4th 2010, show Gkleh Tha Waw village, in Lu Bpleh Township. KHRG researchers reported residents of Gkleh Tha Waw fled on June 5th 2009 due to joint Tatmadaw/DKBA attacks on KNU/KNLA 7th Brigade forces, but returned to rebuild their homes and stay in their village in early 2010. Photo B-16, taken in March 2010, shows Saw G---, a 30 year old farmer from Me--- village in Dta Greh Township. Saw G--- fled to a temporary refugee site in Mae U Su village in Tak Province's Tha Song Yang District on July 5th 2009 due to the Tatmadaw/DKBA offensive in Pa'an. He told KHRG that Thai authorites forced him to return to Burma in March 2010, and that he must now perform daily paid labour in order to buy food to eat; many refugees were unable to prepare fields and homes prior to return due to the sudden repatriation of refugees by Thai authorities in March 2010. Photo B-17, taken on March 31st 2010, shows Saw Pe---, a 10-year-old boy, after accidentally detonating an unexploded M79 cartridge he and his brother had found outside Mae La Ah Kee village. A relative of Saw Pe--- told KHRG that his family had returned to their village in Burma after RTA soldiers forced them to leave the Mae U Su camp. [Photo: KHRG] | B-17
| Surviving with dignity beyond military control Tatmadaw practices appear to be designed to depopulate areas of eastern Burma over which consolidated military control is difficult to establish, particularly upland areas. The well-documented pattern of abuses faced by civilians attempting to remain beyond military control suggests that these practices continue to be widely utilized. Where possible, civilian populations of such areas are forcibly relocated to areas that can easily be controlled – and tapped for material support in the form of finances, labour and materials – by Tatmadaw forces, usually in lowland territory or along established roads. Communities attempting to avoid relocation, and their livelihoods, are then targeted through practices that foster high levels of human insecurity in order to render areas beyond military control effectively uninhabitable. Abuses documented in such areas by KHRG include both willful and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including women and children; attacks and other measures targeting food production and the food supply; the destruction of property essential to civilian survival, including the heavy deployment of landmines in areas essential to civilian livelihoods; and the active obstruction of humanitarian assistance, in particular food, medicine and health services to such areas.[16] Despite the security and humanitarian challenges faced by civilians inhabiting areas beyond consolidated military control, large civilian populations continue to hide in such areas, employing a range of self-protection strategies in order to avoid forced relocation or SPDC Army attacks. Such 'strategic' displacement entails a range of protection measures employed by individuals and communities to ensure adequate preparation for displacement; advance warning of threats; secure removal of all family or community members to a different location; and collective survival for the duration of displacement, including addressing problems related to physical insecurity, restricted movement and constrained access to land, food and health services.[17] C-1
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| Photos C-1 and C-2, taken on February 9th 2010, show abandoned huts in Leh Kee, once a major hiding site for villagers in Lu Thaw Township, Papun District. Leh Kee has been abandoned since Tatmadaw forces active in Lu Thaw Township increased their presence in the area, establishing a camp at Gkaw Daw Gkoh. The previous residents of Leh Kee have since shifted to an alternative site and, according to a KHRG researcher, they do not date to return to Leh Kee as long as it is within range of Tatmadaw military operations. [Photos: KHRG] | C-3
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| Photos C-3 and C-4, taken on March 20th 2010, show homes belonging to villagers in hiding in La---, in T'Naw Tha Ree Township of Mergui-Tavoy District. Villagers fled here during March 2010 due operations of Tatmadaw LIB #17, under Battalion Commander Kyaw Naing in the Ma Noh Roh area of T'Naw Tha Ree Township. Photo C-5, also taken on March 20th, shows one of the families currently hiding in La---. Many families in the site reported that they were confronting food shortages; they told KHRG they planned to attempt to buy food in villages in Tatmadaw- controlled areas, but were afraid of what would happen to them if they were captured by Tatmadaw soldiers. [Photos: KHRG] | C-6
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| Photos C-6 and C-7, taken on April 22nd 2010, show Naw Pah Lah, a 27 year old woman from Khoh Lu village in Ler Doh Township, Nyaunglebin District. Naw P--- was shot during an attack by Tatmadaw LIB #369 on Khaw Hta village on March 22nd 2010. At 6:30 pm, Naw P--- was returning to her home in Kh--- with her infant son and 5-year old daughter from visiting her father in Le---; as her family passed through Khaw Hta, they were fired upon by LIB #369 soldiers. Naw P--- was injured in her side; her 5-year-old daughter Naw Pa--- was shot in the head and killed; and her 5-month old son Saw Ht--- was shot in the leg and buttock and died later that evening.[18] [Photos: KHRG] | C-8
| Photo C-8, taken on March 19th 2010, shows a villager in hiding in La--- village in the Ma Noh Roh area of T'Naw Tha Ree Township in Mergui/Tavoy District. The man is shown pounding paddy. He told a KHRG field researcher that people in his village are always afraid of the Tatmadaw, and worry that Tatmadaw soldiers will come to attack the hiding site and shoot the villagers. [Photo: KHRG] | Photo C-9, taken on April 22nd 2010, shows villagers from Gk--- village in the Ht--- area of Ler Doh Township, Nyaunglebin District carrying rice to their jungle hiding site. These villagers told KHRG that they went into hiding in the jungle after Tatmadaw soldiers came and burned down their village. They reported that in order to have enough food while in hiding, community members needed to travel to L---, a community in a low-lying area along the Shwegyin River, to obtain rice. [Photo: KHRG] | C-9
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| Photo C-10, taken on January 17th 2010, shows a rice storage barn belonging to villagers in hiding at N--- village in Thandaung Township, Toungoo District. Many communities across northern Karen State have become adept at using displacement strategically to avoid human rights abuses, and are capable of surviving harsh conditions outside of their home villages for short or long periods of time.[19] [Photo: KHRG] | The attack on Tha Dah Der village On July 23rd 2010, soldiers from Tatmadaw LIB #370 under Battalion Commander Soe Myint Tun and based at Maw Poo camp in Lu Thaw Township attacked Tha Dah Der village in Tay Mu Der village tract, northern Lu Thaw Township, Papun District. The soldiers shelled more than 41 mortar rounds into Tha Dah Der before entering and setting fire to buildings, destroying villagers' property including water containers, agricultural tools, rice stores and livestock. The unit slept one night in the camp and continued burning buildings in the village the next morning, before returning to their camp at Maw Poo. A KHRG field researcher reported that 34 out of 58 households in Tha Dah Der were burnt down, as was the village church and school. Approximately 600 residents of Tha Dah Der fled to Tha Oh Der, joining approximately 300 other villagers from nearby communities that feared attacks.[20] C-11
| Photos C-11, C-12 and C-13, taken on July 27th 2010, show some of the homes and other buildings destroyed in the July 23rd and 24th Tatmadaw attack on Tha Dah Der village. [Photos: KHRG] | C-12
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| Photos C-14 and C-15, also taken on July 27th 2010, show the remains of the church in Tha Dah Der village, which was burnt down during the attack by Tatmadaw LIB #370. A KHRG researcher also reported that the burning of the church damaged one side of a school the village which was located next to the church. [Photos: KHRG] | C-16
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| Photos C-16 and C-17, taken on July 27th 2010, show animals belonging to residents of Tha Dah Der that were slaughtered by troops from Tatmadaw LIB #370. The KHRG researcher who visited Tha Dah Der just three days after the attack said that pigs, chicken, goats and other animals had been killed and mutilated before Tatmadaw soldiers withdrew from the village. [Photos: KHRG] | C-18
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| Photos C-18, C-19 and C-20, taken on July 27th 2010, show property belonging to residents of Tha Dah Der that was damaged or destroyed in the July 23rd and 24th attack. Many of these items, including food and water storage containers, as well as cooking, agricultural and other livelihoods equipment are essential for daily village life. [Photos: KHRG] | C-21
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| Photos C-21 and C-22, taken on 28th July 2010, show fields cultivated by villagers in the Tha Dah Der area that were damaged by buffaloes while the villagers remained in hiding following the attack by Tatmadaw LIB #370 on Tha Dah Der village. Photo C-21 shows a paddy field near Tha Dah Der in which buffaloes trampled and ate paddy plants. Photo C-22 shows one of four hill fields belonging to residents of T'Kaw Toh Baw, near Tha Dah Der, in which villagers reported that paddy plants were eaten and trampled by buffaloes. Paddy and hill field farmers would normally spend long hours at their agricultural projects, but most communities in the area fled during the attacks on Tha Dah Der on July 23rd and 24th, and did not feel safe to return to their homes immediately afterwards. [Photos: KHRG] | Life under military control The majority of Karen areas in eastern Burma are controlled by the Tatmadaw and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) that have ceasefire agreements with the Tatmadaw. Villagers in controlled areas must contend with a variety of abuses that appear to be related to attempts by these armed groups to consolidate and entrench military authority over lowland areas by improving military infrastructure, as well as systems of civilian control and resource extraction, to support the substantial military presence active in the area. Extractive abuses by Tatmadaw and ceasefire NSAG forces documented by KHRG include various forms of arbitrary taxation and ad hoc demands for financial and material support, as well as demands for various forms of forced labour including: fabricating and delivering building materials; construction and maintenance of roads; portering; forced recruitment into military service; guide, sentry, and 'messenger' duty; construction of army camps, fences, schools, libraries and clinics; and forced agriculture. Demands for forced labour are typically backed by implicit or explicit threats of violence by the issuing authority.[21] KHRG's research strongly indicates that the forced extraction of significant financial, material, and labour resources from civilian populations under control of Tatmadaw and ceasefire NSAG forces is an established, widespread practice throughout eastern Burma. Military personnel who engage in these practices do not appear to be punished or otherwise held accountable for their actions, suggesting that the practice of Tatmadaw units supporting themselves via local extraction is ignored or tacitly condoned, if not explicitly mandated in policy.[22] Extractive demands require villagers to divert crucial time, energy and resources away from their own, typically subsistence, livelihoods. KNLA forces also remains active in some areas under Tatmadaw or ceasefire NSAG control, staging guerrilla-style attacks and placing landmines and booby traps.[23] In response, villagers are frequently placed under tight movement restrictions, with those violating the restrictions risking fines, detention, being shot on sight outside villages or at checkpoints, and abuse as suspected KNU/KNLA members or supporters. Individuals suspected of communicating with or supporting the KNU/KNLA may face detention and questioning, as well as fines, torture, the destruction of their property and enforced disappearance. Movement restrictions restrict the amount of time villagers can spend at their agricultural projects or engaged in livelihoods activities, such as trade or daily labour outside their home village, exacerbating the strain on livelihoods and food security caused by exploitative abuse. It is important to note that rural villagers employ a variety of strategies to minimise or avoid complying with exploitative orders and other abuses. These strategies range from simple requests for reductions in 'taxation' quotas or an alleviation of movement restrictions, to aggressive challenges for military personnel to withdraw their demands. Utilising firsthand knowledge of and experience with local military personnel – and repression – local villagers are often skilled at discerning how much or how little space exists to oppose particular abuses. Strategies which villagers employ in areas under the consolidated control of the Tatmadaw or ceasefire NSAGs include, amongst other techniques complaints and negotiation; bribery or payment of 'fines' to avoid fulfilling a demand, including negotiations to reduce payments; lying; refusing; confronting; seeking intervention or mediation from alternate mutually-recognised authorities or respected figures; various forms of discreet partial or false compliance; and evasion.[24] D-1
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| Photo D-1,taken on February 4th 2010, shows a major Tatmadaw camp in Gkaw Thay Der village, Tantabin Township, Toungoo District. Information from KHRG's field researchers indicates that battalions from Tatmadaw Military Operation Command (MOC) #7 have been active in Toungoo since the end of 2009. Villagers in the Gkaw Thay Der area report that Tatmadaw troops have rotated between camps as frequently as twice a month this year, and that whichever unit is based at Gkaw Thay Der camp makes frequent demands for forced labour from residents of nearby villages, including Gklay Soh Kee, Gkaw Thay Der, Kler La and Gkaw Muh Der.[25] Photo D-2, also taken on February 4th 2010, shows villagers passing in front of the Tatmadaw camp in Gkaw Thay Der on their way back from collecting firewood in the forest. [Photos: KHRG] | D-3
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| Photos D-3 and D-4, taken on March 19th 2010, show villagers from B--- village, Bu Tho Township, Papun District clearing roadside brush as ordered by soldiers from Tatmadaw LIB #340 based in M--- village. According to local sources, all of the villages located near the vehicle road in Meh Gklaw village tract, including Boh Htar, Meh T'Ru, Ta Bpoh Gklah, Bweh Gklah and Gkaw La Gklah villages, are required to clear roadside brush and grass every year and do not receive food or payment for their work. This labour entails high physical security risks for villagers, as roadways in northern Karen State are frequently mined by Tatmadaw, DKBA, and KNLA forces with each party seeking to disrupt the others' operations, secure territory for themselves while denying territory to their adversaries. [Photos: KHRG] | D-5
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| Photos D-5 and D-6, taken on March 19th 2010, show a paddy field controlled by Tatmadaw LIB #340 in Meh Gklaw village tract, Bu Tho Township. Local villagers told a KHRG field researcher that this paddy field is four acres in size, and that LIB #340 forces residents of B--- village to plant and plough the paddy every year. [Photos: KHRG] | D-7
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| Photos D-7 and D-8, taken on March 19th 2010, show residents of B--- village, Bu Tho Township fabricating and delivering thatch shingles to fulfill an order issued by soldiers from Tatmadaw LIB #340 based in the area. Local sources report that the local Tatmadaw camp to which the thatch was to be delivered is approximately one hour from B--- on foot. Thatch is a common building material in eastern Burma, typically used for roofing buildings. [Photos: KHRG] | D-9
| Photo D-9, taken on April 8th 2010, shows a man from Bp--- village in Than Daung Township, Toungoo District astride his motorcycle. He told KHRG that he had previously been forced to carry Tatmadaw rations with his motorbike from Bp--- to N--- village by Tatmadaw MOC #7 soldiers based at a camp in M---, and under the command of Officer M---. He added that there are several checkpoints on the road between Bp--- and N--- that each demand 500 Kyat from a passing motorcycle, and that officers at these checkpoints sometimes charge villagers even though they are carrying Tatmadaw rations. [Photo: KHRG] | Photo D-10, taken on May 9th 2010, shows an order letter issued to a village head in Thaundaung Township by a Tatmadaw unit based from MOC #7 based at Ma--, under the command of Officer My--. The letter demands that the village head come to the Tatmadaw camp to meet the officer who wrote the letter. The village head later told KHRG that at the meeting the Tatmadaw commander ordered him to arrange for villagers to porter Tatmadaw rations. [Photo: KHRG] | D-10
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| Photo D-11, taken on April 10th 2010, shows villagers in Thandaung Township portering Tatmadaw rations from the camp at Ma-- to Kler La, where the MOC Headquarters for Toungoo District is located. The KHRG researcher that photographed these porters said that the group included girls as young as 15. He estimated the weight of the loads at 15 viss (24.5 kg. / 54 lb.), saying that these were too heavy for some porters to carry alone. [Photo: KHRG] | D-12 | D-13 | Photo D-12 taken in April 2010, shows money collected by residents of Ht--- village in Meh Gklaw village tract, Bu Thoh Township to pay 'porter fees' to soldiers from DKBA Gk'Saw Wah Special Battalion #777 active in the area. Local sources told KHRG that Soldiers inform village in the area that they must pay the fees instead of providing porters. Local residents said that DKBA soldiers have demanded 15,000 kyat per month in porter fees from villages in Meh Gklaw village tract since November 2009. [photo: KHRG] | Photo D-13 taken on April 13th 2010, shows logs cut by residents of T---, W---, D--- and Ht--- villages, in Meh Gklaw village tract. Local sources report that DKBA forces based at Way Lu Won monastery in Papun Town under the command of officer Hs---, demanded that each village in Meh Gklaw village tract provide three tons of logs to support DKBA logging businesses in Meh Gklaw and Mae Mweh village tracts. [photo: KHRG] | Livelihoods under strain Most families and communities in rural eastern Burma engage in subsistence livelihoods requiring high inputs of labour, time and resources. In addition to these already difficult circumstances, however, villagers must struggle on a daily basis to retain control over land and the freedom to pursue livelihoods activities; as the Tatmadaw and other non-state armed forces seek to control the civilian population, a number of military practices undermine villagers' control over their land and livelihoods. In areas beyond permanent military control, these practices are oriented towards making such areas uninhabitable for civilians and include: staging military attacks on villagers engaged in farming activities; forcibly relocating accessible civilian populations away from land; sending patrols to pre-burn damp fields to prevent a complete burn; deploying landmines in agricultural areas; and destroying paddy and other crops and paddy storage facilities. Restrictions on humanitarian support to communities in such areas, including military attacks on support providers, mean that villagers are in many cases entirely dependent on acutely constrained livelihoods activities. In mixed administration or areas of consolidated military control, including relocation sites, practices are oriented towards control of and extraction of resources from civilian populations and include: a range of forced labour demands that divert time and resources from civilian livelihoods; arbitrary taxation on trade and small-scale industry; and movement restrictions that geographically and temporally constrain villagers' livelihoods activities. The tension between military practices and civilian efforts to pursue livelihoods severely undercuts the human security of communities across eastern Burma. Consequences include widespread and persistent economic insecurity and cyclical household indebtedness, food shortages and high rates of malnutrition, and a range of health vulnerabilities. In the face of such direct challenges to their livelihoods, villagers have responded by adopting supplementary occupations, migrating in search of work, hiding food storage bins in the forest, and operating small covert hill fields and 'jungle' markets in order to evade restrictions and harmful practices of the Tatmadaw and other armed groups seeking to consolidate or expand control of civilian populations.
E-1 | E-2 | Photo E-1, taken on May 25th 2010, shows a villager in D--- village, Lu Thaw Township, Papun District cutting grass in her hill field to protect the young paddy crop. Hill field farmers must carefully tend their plots, clearing weeds, grass and leaves to reduce the presence of destructive insects, as well as keeping buffaloes, wild pigs and other animals from eating or destroying the paddy plants. [photo: KHRG] | Photo E-2, taken in February 2010, shows villagers who fled from L--- village to a hiding site in Lu Thaw Township, Papun District. The villagers are cutting down trees to prepare a new hill field. They will wait one month to allow the felled trees to dry before burning them to fertilise the soil. After clearing any unburned wood, the field will be ready for planting, and the villagers will build field huts to be able to remain near their crop at important junctures in the agricultural cycle. [photo: KHRG] | E-3
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| Photos E-3, taken on March 22nd 2010, shows villagers from a hiding site in the Sh--- area of Nyaunglebin District, working as day labourers carrying bamboo near Shwegyin town. Faced with acute food insecurity across much of northern Karen State, many villagers in hiding must perform such daily labour in order to be able to feed themselves and their families.[26] Photo E-4, also taken on March 22nd 2010, shows a hut where villagers from hiding sites in Sh--- sleep while they are away from their homes performing daily labour. [Photos: KHRG] | E-5
| Photo E-5, taken on March 22nd 2010, shows villagers in Shwegyin Township, Nyaunglebin District who own a bullock cart using it to transport lumber. They earn a living by charging fees for usage of the cart; villagers who do not own bullock carts can also earn daily wages as extra labourers loading and unloading the cart. [Photo: KHRG] | E-6
| E-7
| Photos E-6 and E-7, taken on March 30th 2010, show villagers who live in Tatmadaw relocation sites in T'Naw Tha Ree Township, Mergui-Tavoy District travelling outside of the relocation sites to pursue livelihoods activities elsewhere in the Ma Noh Roh area. In photo E-6, villagers cut fish caught in the local river; in photo E-7 villagers engaged in trading wood are loading bamboo rafts to ship wood along the river. Residents of the area told KHRG that they are required to buy permission documents if they need to travel in the area for any purpose. [Photos: KHRG] | Destruction of villagers' agricultural projects E-8
| E-9
| Photos E-8, taken in April 2010, shows a field hut and burned rubber trees belonging Saw M--- that were destroyed by mortars launched by IB #548 on April 23rd 2010 in P---village, Waw Raw (Win Yaw) Township, Dooplaya District. Saw M---'s entire plantation of 1,600 trees is now damaged and needs to be replanted. Photo E-9, also taken in April 2010, shows rubber trees in a plantation belonging to Saw T--- that were burned and destroyed in the same incident; all 1,370 trees on his plantation will need to be replanted. [Photos: KHRG] | Photo E-10, taken in April 2010, shows Saw T---, a resident of P--- village, Waw Raw (Win Yaw) Township. Saw T---'s rubber plantation was destroyed in a fire caused by mortars launched by IB #548 on April 23rd 2010; the gas powered brush cutter he used for maintaining his plantation, pictured left, was also damaged in the fire.[27] [Photo: KHRG] | E-10
| E-11 | E-12 | Photo E-11, taken on January 9th 2010, shows betelnut trees in plantations maintained by villagers in Tantabin Township, Toungoo District; the trees were damaged by soldiers from Tatmadaw LIB #427, under MOC #7, who were patrolling in the area. The majority of villagers in Toungoo are dependent on producing crops such as betel and cardamom that can be transported to markets and traded to acquire rice and other essential items. [photo: KHRG] | Photo E-12, taken on February 8th 2010, shows smoke rising from burning cardamom plantations along the Kler La to Buh Hsa Kee road between See Kheh Der and Plaw Moo Der in Tantabin Township, Toungoo District. Patrolling Tatmadaw forces set fire to vegetation along the road, including cardamom plantations, while rations were being delivered to camps in the area.[28] [photo: KHRG] | E-13
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| E-15
| Photo E-13, taken on May 10th 2010, shows a cardamom plantation, owned by residents of Bp--- village, Than Daung Township, Toungoo District, that was destroyed in a fire set by soldiers from Tatmadaw LIB #425 based Maw Pa Der camp while on patrol. Photos E-14 and E-15, taken on May 11th 2010, show field huts belonging to Saw K--- and his cousin, both villagers from Ku--- village, which were also burned by patrolling LIB #425 troops, destroying blankets, plates and other possessions stored inside. Local sources believed that Tatmadaw soldiers were destroying plantations and homes and enforcing tight travel restrictions to clear the area for a road between Maw Pa Der and the Day Loh river, where they intend to build a dam. [Photos: KHRG] | Landmines Landmines are used extensively by the Tatmadaw and all non-state armed groups active in eastern Burma, and pose a range of threats to civilians. Tatmadaw, DKBA and KNLA forces, and sometimes villagers themselves, use landmines on roads, paths and around camps and villages in shoot-on-sight areas, as well as in some mixed-administration areas. None of these actors have the capacity to comprehensively map and de-mine contaminated areas when camps are vacated or mines are no longer needed. State and non-state armed groups have also used landmines to control movements by the civilian population, particularly between mixed-administration and shoot-on-sight areas. In areas where these forces have attempted to expand control or drive populations into lowland relocation sites, landmines have been placed in abandoned villages to prevent return by villagers in hiding. Landmines have also been used to prevent access to agricultural land for villagers in hiding, and to prevent villagers from leaving forced relocation sites or returning to abandoned villages and agricultural land. Landmines are not always clearly marked, nor are communities always warned of new dangerous landmine areas. The Tatmadaw appears to have shared landmines with the DKBA, which has placed these landmines in civilian areas without providing warnings to local communities. KHRG has also documented incidents of DKBA and Tatmadaw soldiers using civilians to clear landmines, as well as forcing civilians to walk in front of patrols to trigger mines, booby-traps or ambushes laid by KNLA. Civilians have been forced to clear brush and debris from roadsides known to be mined by all parties to the conflict, an activity which amount to de facto dangerous and involuntary mine-clearance. Unexploded remnants of war remain a significant threat to civilian populations, particularly children, in many parts of eastern Burma.[29] F-1
| F-2
| Photos F-1 and F-2, taken on March 26th and March 29th 2010 respectively, show two civilians after they were injured by landmines while engaging in regular livelihoods activities outside Wo--- village Tantabin Township, Toungoo Distirct. Saw Pu---, 46, stepped on a landmine while returning from his betelnut plantation to his home in Wo--- village on March 29th. Just three days earlier, on March 26th Naw Le---, 40, stepped on a mine while collecting firewood with other women from Wo--- at forested hill near the local SPDC Army camp. Both villagers injured their right legs and were assisted by their fellow villagers, who constructed stretchers and carried them to the nearest medical facility, approximately two hours away on foot. Villagers in Wo--- believed that the mines had been planted by SPDC LIB #427, which had been active in the area and maintained a camp near Wo--- since the beginning of 2010. The unit had reportedly been planting landmines carelessly around the village since it arrived in the area.[30] [Photos: KHRG] | F-3
| Photo F-3, taken on May 29th 2010, shows Saw Nu---, 18, who stepped on an SPDC landmine when returning to his village from Mo---village, Lu Thaw Township. The mine had been planted on a jungle path. [Photo: KHRG] | Photo F-4, also taken on May 29th 2010, shows Saw Qu---, 27, a gher der member from G---village, Lu Thaw Township. Saw Qu--- was familiar with the locations of some landmines planted by the KNLA and local gher der, but was injured when walking in an area he did not realise had been mined.[31] [Photo: KHRG] | F-4
| F-5
| Photo F-5, taken on December 21st 2009, shows improvised KNLA landmines, often described by villagers as 'homemade' landmines. These devices typically become inactive within six months from when they are deployed. KNLA soldiers plant landmines such as these along roads, paths and near Tatmadaw camps; villagers have reported that they are usually informed of the locations of KNLA landmines. Landmines planted by all armed groups active in eastern Burma nonetheless present a risk for villagers. [Photo: KHRG] | Photo F-6, taken on December 21st 2009, shows a hand grenade belonging to a villager who resides in a hiding site in Toungoo District. The villager told a KHRG researcher that he carried this grenade for protection, in case Tatmadaw forces attacked while he was working in his hill field. Civilians trying to live in areas beyond permanent military control are in danger of being shot on sight by Tatmadaw patrols, which do not distinguish civilians from soldiers in such areas.[32] [Photo: KHRG] | F-6
| Children in armed conflict In April 2008, KHRG released the report Growing up under militarisation: Abuse and agency of children in Karen State, which documented the situation for children in Karen areas, where they must contend with a variety of difficult circumstances related to armed conflict. In January 2010, KHRG released another report on the situation for children in Karen areas. Titled Grave Violations: Assessing abuses of child rights in Karen areas during 2009, the report concluded that grave violations of children's rights increased during 2009. It is important, however, to emphasise that children, and their communities, are not passive victims. Though this section does include photos of child victims, it is primarily made up of photos depicting the ways that children and their families respond proactively to abuse, including by taking measures to seek greater physical security for family members and working together to strengthen livelihoods and food security , even in the face of great adversity. G-1
| Photo G-1, taken on February 2nd 2010, shows a boy from Ba--- village, Lu Thaw Township, Papun District carrying some of his family's possessions in a gku, a kind of basket worn on the back and supported by a strap slung around the forehead that is widely used in rural eastern Burma. His family said they were fleeing to a hiding site because they heard that Tatmadaw soldiers were active near their village, and they were afraid of what would happen if the troops reached their village. [Photo: KHRG] | Photo G-2, taken on March 20th 2010, shows children living in a hiding site in Ht--- village in the Ma Noh Roh area of T'Naw Tha Ree Township, Mergui-Tavoy District. Families in hiding in Ma Noh Roh told KHRG that they fled after soldiers from Tatmadaw IB #17 set up camps in their area in March 2010 and looted villagers' property and animals. According to a KHRG field researcher, villagers in hiding in Ma Noh Roh have to be ready to flee on short notice because Tatmadaw soldiers are active nearby. Families have also reported facing a weak harvest this year, as rat infestation has resulted in the destruction of much of their paddy. [Photo: KHRG] | G-2
| G-3
| Photo G-3, taken on June 2nd 2010, shows children living in Th--- village, a hiding site in Lu Thaw Township, Papun District for families from a number of upland communities threatened by Tatmadaw attacks. Older children often stay at home to look after younger siblings while their parents travel outside of the village to engage in livelihoods activities such as maintaining agricultural projects or working as wage labourers. [Photo: KHRG] | Photo G-4, taken on May 30th 2010, shows children living in D--- village, Lu Thaw Township, Papun District. These children came to D--- in 2009 when their families fled Tatmadaw attacks in Yeh Mu Bplaw village. Villagers told KHRG that many people try flee to D--- when they have to leave their villages, because their children have good opportunities to continue their education there. Ensuring that children receive education, even under extremely challenging conditions, remains a priority for many families across Karen State, and communities go to great lengths to provide flexible and resilient education systems.[33] [Photo: KHRG] | G-4
| G-5
| Photo G-5, taken on May 23rd 2010, shows another child in D--- village. Other villagers told a KHRG researcher that the boy's parents had gone to clear weeds and perform other regular maintenance tasks in their hill field. [Photo: KHRG] | Photo G-6, taken in February 2010, shows children whose families fled from Leh Kee village in Lu Thaw Township, Papun District helping fell trees to prepare a new hill field. Communities in hiding in northern Karen State face several challenges to food production and security, including a scarcity of suitable land for cultivation in areas where there is less risk of Tatmadaw attacks;[34] under such circumstances, all members of a family contribute what they can to food production and livelihoods activities. [Photo: KHRG] | G-6
| G-7
| Photo G-7, taken on June 2nd 2010, shows two children in D--- village on the back of an elephant. They told a KHRG field researcher that they earn money to support their families by hiring out the elephant, for example to carry firewood. [Photo: KHRG] | G-8
| G-9
| Photos G-8 and G-9, taken on March 19th 2010, shows young boys from Gk--- village in Meh Gklaw village tract, Bu Tho Township, Papun District performing forced labour near their village. According to a KHRG field researcher who spoke with villagers in the area, soldiers from Tatmadaw LIB #340 that were based at a camp next to a vehicle road in Meh T'Ru village ordered Gklaw Bper village to clear brush from sections of the road near their village. The boys were not provided money or food for this labour. [Photos: KHRG] | G-10
| Photo G-10, taken on February 23rd 2010, shows a boy from Hr--- village in Bu Tho Township, Papun District carrying thatch shingles to meet a forced labour order issued by a local Tatmadaw unit. Local villagers told KHRG that Tatmadaw LIB #434 soldiers active in the area demanded that residents of Hr--- fabricate and deliver 300 thatch shingles to a camp located between between Wa--- and Ta---, approximately one hour's walk from the village. [Photo: KHRG] |
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