Wednesday, August 10, 2011

Uncertain futures

Attempts by the junta to dismantle and bring ethnic ceasefire groups under its direct control by making them join a Border Guard Force have failed

Monsoon rains lash the mountains along the northern Thai-Burma border. Thunder rumbles overhead, lightening flashes and streams of mud wash across the narrow road. Pickup trucks, limited by the ineffectiveness of their windscreen wipers against the deluge, pull to the side of the mountain road and stop.

Colonel Sai Htoo.

Sheltered from the rains in a border safe house, Col Sai Htoo, eases onto a wooden day bed, crosses and tucks both legs under him before explaining why the two major Shan armed groups are now united under the banner of the Shan State Army.

"Before we believed we could solve our issues with the Burmese army by political means, but their actions didn't match their promises. Then they forced us to join the BGF [Border Guard Force]. But we've learned our lesson, we Shan now know, as do all the other ethnic people of Burma, we know the enemy, we need to fight together for our shared ideals and our survival."

Col Sai Htoo said that on May 21 _ the Shan People's Resistance Day _ it was announced that the former non-ceasefire Shan State Army South and the ceasefire Shan State Army North factions would merge to form the Shan State Army (SSA).

"There is only one Shan State Army now. Our strength will be our unity. In the past we have let ourselves be split by the Burmese Army, but we've learned from that. Our ceasefire agreement was written on air, it was worthless."

Col Sai Htoo's safe house is an estimated 30-hour pot-holed riddled drive to his headquarters, 320km away in Wan Hai, where the SSA has been under siege from 14 Burmese army battalions supported by artillery units since March 13.

"Senior Burmese army officers back in March threatened they would overrun us in a week. It is now over four months and we have killed or wounded 800 of their soldiers for about 20 of ours [killed or wounded]."

The colonel says it is not the first time Burmese army senior officers have openly boasted about what they would do to the Shan fighters.

"In March 2010 Burmese army general Aung Than Htut said to us, 'Do you have more men, more money and more weapons than the Kokang [ethnic army]? No! We thrashed the Kokang in three days, for you Shan it will take us two hours'. But 15 months later, they still haven't achieved it."

EXPLOSIVE SITUATION: A stockpile of renegade BGF armaments.

Col Sai Htoo's optimism is hard-edged with the reality of doing battle with thousands of Burmese army soldiers surrounding his headquarters at Wan Hai, in central Shan state.

"They have even used jet fighters to bomb us. But now the heavy rain and fog is helping us. The morale of the Burmese army soldiers is low, especially, as they are suffering heavy losses. In one week from June 30 to July 7 our fighters killed 100, wounded 200 and another 80 of their soldiers ran away."

Sitting next to Col Sai Htoo, is Maj Sai Hla, who credits the Shan's battlefield successes to a change in training and tactics.

"Our strategy now is not to confront head-to-head, but hit hard, run and ambush. We target their senior officers and have killed some. The Burmese army soldiers don't want to fight, it's not their land or people. Our soldiers are fighting for our people's rights _ to stop the suppression and the rape, and for our equality."

DESPERATE CROSSING: Karen villagers displaced by the Burmese army ford a stream.

BORDER GUARD FORCE

In 2008, Burma's military regime announced, as prescribed in its constitution, that it planned to disarm, dismantle and restructure all of the major 17 ethnic ceasefire groups into BGF units under the strict control of the Burmese army.

The restructuring did not go according to plan. Senior army officers responsible for establishing the BGF were confronted with armed resistance as the ceasefire militia groups struggled to keep their power, their business assets and their national identities.

The larger armed ethnic groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) refused to join the BGF.

Professor Desmond Ball of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra says the ceasefire agreements first began to unravel in August and September 2009 when the Burmese army attacked its former ally, the Kokang ceasefire group, an ethnic Chinese militia alleged to be involved in the heroin and amphetamine trade. As a result of the intense bombardment by the Burmese army more than 35,000 Kokang refugees crossed the border into China.

A year later the Burmese army tried once more tried to unarm and dismantle the ceasefire groups under the guise of the BGF.

Naw Zipporah Sein, KNU general secretary.

In Karen State it was looking good for the Burmese army. Starting on the Aug 18, 2010 the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and senior Burmese army officers began signing their BGF agreements at elaborate ceremonies featuring dancing, music and flag waving. The ceremonies gave the Burmese army the photographic and television opportunities they so badly needed before voters went to the polls last Nov 7 in the country's first elections in 20 years.

At noon on polling day, as the regime got ready to assume power, it began to go downhill for the Burmese army. A renegade DKBA commander, Maj Gen Saw Lah Pwe, destroyed the regime's election-day party when he sacked the border town of Myawaddy and announced that he was now at war with his former allies, the Burmese army.

By April, the government was dealt another blow _ about 1,000 former DKBA Border Guard Force soldiers deserted.

The well-organised renegade BGF soldiers, led by Maj Saw Beeh, are reported to have plenty of weapons and are stockpiling hundreds of explosive devices for use in ambushes.

Maj Saw Beeh, speaking in a video-taped interview with Karen News, explained why he split from the control of the Burmese army: "Our people didn't like the BGF; they said we looked like the Burmese army and the people were afraid we would act like the Burma army if we remained as BGF."

Maj Saw Beeh said it was not long before Burmese officers started to impose restrictions on the former DKBA fighters.

"We asked for our DKBA insignia to be sewn on our uniforms, but they refused.

We were not allowed to attend Karen cultural celebrations, not even Karen New Year.''

Maj Saw Beeh said he is now willing to work and fight together with fighters from the Burma army's oldest antagonists _ the Karen National Union (KNU).

''If we're fighting, they'll help us, if they're fighting we'll help them. We both have the same ideas, we both know who we have to fight and why. Karen people need their political freedom, we are fighting for our survival and our culture.''

The SSA's Col Sai Htoo agreed with Maj Saw Beeh's position and said the Burmese army lacked respect for ethnic people, their grievances or their culture.

''Joining the BGF meant we would lose our political position, our military position. Out of every 100 BGF positions, 30 are allocated to the Burmese army. All the important decision-making positions in the BGF _ health, communications, supplies, logistics and weapons were under the command of the Burmese army. Soldiers over 50 were to be retired, that was one way to get rid of those with with political experience and awareness. Under the BGF, ethnic soldiers would be treated like expendable guard dogs.''

Paul Keenan, a regional-based researcher working on Burma's ethnic issues for the past 14 years, explains that the regime's failure to recognise ethnic rights and aspirations means the never-ending conflicts will be difficult to resolve.

''It is a failure of the military regime. They do not understand ethnic issues nor are they able to grasp what the ethnic groups are fighting for. The regime has never considered the ethnic people have had an equal part to play in the country's politics. They dismiss them as separatists and have treated them as such. The ethnic resistance is looking for equality, but they are being denied by the regime.''

Samuel Blythe, a regional political and defence analyst, who also writes for Jane's Defence Weekly, says the BGF initiative has intensified the ethnic groups' conflicts with the Burmese army.

''It was always intended as a first step to dominate and eliminate the ethnic armed groups. The BGF has exasperated the tensions _ it has brought some of the key unresolved ethnic issues to the forefront. If all the ceasefire groups enter the conflict it could end in widespread open warfare.''

READY FOR BATTLE: Maj Saw Beeh’s fighters prepare mortars to use against the Burmese army.

On June 9, fighting between the Burmese army and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) ended the 17-year ceasefire between the two forces. Fighting broke out over the Chinese-controlled hydropower dams along the Taping River area.

Henry, a consultant to the Kachin Independence Organisations's Political Strategy and Analyst Office, says the KIA will never accept the BGF. ''We're happy to be part of an Union Army, not the Burmese Army. In the Burmese Army there's no place for ethnic identity. We don't have choices. We need to fight, we're on the edge, we need to defend ourselves.''

He says the ceasefire did nothing for ethnic equality.

''We gained little, but it's important to note that if the overall system is rotten, there cannot be any meaningful progress.''

Henry says the Kachin tried hard to work with the regime. ''We made a ceasefire, attended the national constitution process, we followed the regime's 'road map'. It wasn't enough they then used the BGF to put the squeeze on us. It showed the 17-year ceasefire was nonsense. The regime said they wanted a federal system, but they don't have a genuine spirit to share with the ethnic people.''

It is estimated that since the fighting began in June, more 15,000 people have been displaced and have fled to the relative safety of the Chinese border. Human rights groups have documented atrocities committed by the Burmese Army soldiers against civilians. They include rape, torture and killings.

At the time of writing, Kachin sources say their leaders have demanded, in exchange for withdrawing their fighters, that the government implement a nationwide ceasefire within 15 days.

Henry points out that the Kachin have never wanted to secede. He said sharing power with ethnic groups would remove the reasons for them to fight.

''As soon as ethnic people talk about their rights they are accused of being separatists. The problem is simple - share power with the ethnic people, but there's no will or spirit to share. If they shared there would be no reason to fight."

Henry says the conflict in Burma is not the fault of the ethnic communities.

''There's been a failure by the regime to implement a real federal union. The government talks about a civilian parliament, their 'road map to democracy', but in the constitution there are no rights for ethnic people. The 'road map' is a strategy to appease the international pressure.''

Prof Ball agreed and added: ''It's hard to understand why a number of European governments and political pundits are painting such a dismal picture of where the ethnic groups are at, while offering confidence in the cosmetic military proxy government. The ethnic groups are constantly subjected to harsh and inhumane attacks, but there are signs of an ethnic revival and a reunification between the armed groups.''

Prof Ball says resistance by the ceasefire groups to joining the BGF scheme has acted as a catalyst for the ethnic armies to form an effective alliance.

TOGETHER WE STAND

Prof Ball warns that it is not enough for the ethnic groups to have broken and moved away from the ceasefires with the Burmese government. ''If they just go back to pursuing their own agendas as they did before, they'll be going back to getting knocked-off one-by-one. The ceasefires across the country are falling apart, but it is still too early to say it is the final break.''

Prof Ball believes the groups need to find ways to cooperate and to quickly find common ground.

''If they want to exist they have to work together. Factionalism is the most debilitating weakness the ethnic resistance has. The quicker they deal with it the more chance they have of survival. Otherwise this regime will wipe them out.''

Zipporah Sein, the first women leader to serve as the Karen National Union's general secretary, says that the ethnic organisations are already working on ways they can be united.

''We are working together. We acknowledge we have the same political goals. The regime learned nothing from the conflict, but the ethnic groups did. The ceasefires were all about business, nothing about education, hospitals, culture or ways to improve people's lives. We want real peace and development. There's enough evidence that ceasefires without real political change are worthless.''

Ms Sein says the attacks by the Burmese Army in Kachin, Shan and Karen states are proof that the elections achieved nothing for ethnic people.

''It pretends it is now a civilian government, but these attacks on civilian populations are evidence that it is still the same old regime giving orders.''

A senior Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) officer, with more than 20-years of combat experience said forming an ethnic alliance is complex but not impossible.

''We have common objectives, for the Karen and the Karenni we don't need to debate _ we know from bitter experience who the enemy is. Some groups have had a ceasefire with no fighting for decades, but they lost control of their lands and natural resources in exchange.''

The senior officer said it would be difficult for the Burmese army to contain all the groups if widespread fighting breaks out.

''They'll have trouble putting the lid back on, if the large and small groups continue with unconventional warfare they won't be able to control it. We need unity. The ethnic alliance is only as strong as people make it. We still need to be tighter. If we work together that will send a strong message to the people of Burma.''

Col Sai Htoo agrees a strong ethnic alliance is needed.

''Separated we are weak. The time and circumstances are right now. Under the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) we have agreements with Karenni, Karen, Mon, Chin, Kachin, Arakanes and Shan ethnic groups. Our main policy is we'll fight with politics together and we'll fight our armed resistance together.''

A defiant Col Sai Htoo says if ethnic people fight each other they will lose.

''If we join forces we have a chance of winning our freedom and be given respect as equals.

''We'll even accept the surrender of the Burmese army and we'll consider letting them join us in a real federal army.''

Col Sai Htoo says a number of smaller Shan groups have joined with the Burmese army.

''They are in it for business. They are armed to protect logging, mining and other contraband. They're mostly aligned with the Burmese army through drugs. The Burmese army shares in the profits.''

Prof Ball says the United Wa State Army holds the key to how many of the smaller ethnic groups will get involved in resisting the Burmese army.

''The big question is where the Wa fits into an ethnic alliance. Which way the Wa decides to go will determine how strong the other groups will be.''

Prof Ball estimates that the odds of the Wa resisting the Burmese army orders to form as BGF are about even.

''It's reached the point where there is a good chance they will break their ceasefire. They have already faced off with the Burmese army in the last twelve months.

''If the Wa goes against the regime, it loses its strongest ally, who have about 25,000 to 30,000 trained fighters.''

Prof Ball says the Wa are attempting to get out of the drug trade and invest in legitimate businesses.

''The Wa have been emptying their amphetamine warehouses and stockpiling weapons and ammunition with the revenue they've earned for the last two years.

''If there's a war they want to be able to defend themselves.''

Mr Keenan says the Wa will continue to refuse to join the BGF.

''The Wa's historic and ethnic aspirations are not going to be compromised, and while they were willing to allow some form of inte gration at the lower levels, they would never sign over their armed forces to total control by the military regime. Armed conflict in Wa areas could see the UWSA forces ally with other anti-regime groups under the UNFC banner.''

Prof Ball says it is not the ethnic resistance but Burmese government policies that have brought about the current hostilities.

''They've had 20 years of ceasefires and nothing has changed for the ethnic people. It is a culpable and dismal failure of the government to address ethnic grievances.

The groups have taken up arms against the government because of its ethnic chauvinism, religious intolerance, harassment and brutality towards ethnic communities.''

Prof Ball says the government has also failed to involve ethnic groups in investment projects.

''Ceasefire groups have never been asked to sit down and discuss development projects, agricultural schemes, dams, foreign investment or their cultural differences.

''The reason the groups initially took up arms has never been addressed. The ethnic people feel the government constantly cheats them.''

Prof Ball adds that if the Wa and the other ethnic groups all work together the Burmese military powers might have to make concessions.

''Factor in Aung San Suu Kyi, urban based activists and the monks into that equation. The military then would have to make real concessions, not cosmetic ones like we're seeing with the recent elections, but real genuine concessions.

''It's a whole new future.''

No comments: